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Civic Crowdfunding is emerging as a popular means to mobilize funding fromcitizens for public projects. A popular mechanism deployed on civiccrowdfunding platforms is a provision point mechanism, wherein, the totalcontributions must reach a predetermined threshold in order for the project tobe provisioned (undertaken). Such a mechanism may have multiple equilibria;unfortunately, in many of these equilibria, the project is not funded even ifit is highly valued among the agents. Recent work has proposed mechanisms withrefund bonuses where the project gets funded in equilibrium if its net value ishigher than a threshold among the agents who are aware of the crowdfundingeffort. In this paper, we formalize the notion of social desirability of apublic project and propose mechanisms which use the idea of referrals to expandthe pool of participants and achieve an equilibrium in which the project getsfunded if its net value exceeds a threshold among the entire agent population.We call this new class of mechanisms Referral-Embedded Provision PointMechanisms (REPPM). We specifically propose two variants of REPPM and boththese mechanisms have the remarkable property that, at equilibrium, referralbonuses are offered but there is no need for actual payment of these bonuses.We establish that any given agent's equilibrium strategy is to refer otheragents and to contribute in proportion to the agent's true value for theproject. By referring others to contribute, an agent can, in fact, reduce hisequilibrium contribution. In our view, the proposed mechanisms will lead to anincrease in the number of projects that are funded on civic crowdfundingplatforms.

Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects