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Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is a leading mechanism driving humancooperation, where monitoring of behaviour and sharing reputation-relatedinformation are crucial. Because collecting information is costly, a tragedy ofthe commons can arise, with some individuals free-riding on informationsupplied by others. This can be overcome by organising monitors that aggregateinformation, supported by fees from their information users. We analyse aco-evolutionary model of individuals playing a social dilemma game and monitorswatching them; monitors provide information and players vote for a morebeneficial monitor. We find that (1) monitors that simply rate defection badlycannot stabilise cooperation---they have to overlook defection againstill-reputed players; (2) such overlooking monitors can stabilise cooperation ifplayers vote for monitors rather than to change their own strategy; (3) STERNmonitors, who rate cooperation with ill-reputed players badly, stabilisecooperation more easily than MILD monitors, who do not do so; (4) a STERNmonitor wins if it competes with a MILD monitor; and (5) STERN monitors requirea high level of surveillance and achieve only lower levels of cooperation,whereas MILD monitors achieve higher levels of cooperation with loose and thuslower cost monitoring.

Voting by Hands Promotes Institutionalised Monitoring in Indirect Reciprocity