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Acoustic emanations of computer keyboards represent a serious privacy issue.As demonstrated in prior work, physical properties of keystroke sounds mightreveal what a user is typing. However, previous attacks assumed relativelystrong adversary models that are not very practical in many real-worldsettings. Such strong models assume: (i) adversary's physical proximity to thevictim, (ii) precise profiling of the victim's typing style and keyboard,and/or (iii) significant amount of victim's typed information (and itscorresponding sounds) available to the adversary.  This paper presents and explores a new keyboard acoustic eavesdropping attackthat involves Voice-over-IP (VoIP), called Skype & Type (S&T), while avoidingprior strong adversary assumptions. This work is motivated by the simpleobservation that people often engage in secondary activities (including typing)while participating in VoIP calls. As expected, VoIP software acquires andfaithfully transmits all sounds, including emanations of pressed keystrokes,which can include passwords and other sensitive information. We show that onevery popular VoIP software (Skype) conveys enough audio information toreconstruct the victim's input -- keystrokes typed on the remote keyboard. Ourresults demonstrate that, given some knowledge on the victim's typing style andkeyboard model, the attacker attains top-5 accuracy of 91.7% in guessing arandom key pressed by the victim.  Furthermore, we demonstrate that S&T is robust to various VoIP issues (e.g.,Internet bandwidth fluctuations and presence of voice over keystrokes), thusconfirming feasibility of this attack. Finally, it applies to other popularVoIP software, such as Google Hangouts.

Don't Skype & Type! Acoustic Eavesdropping in Voice-Over-IP