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The secondary control in direct current microgrids (MGs) is used to restorethe voltage deviations caused by the primary droop control, where the latter isimplemented locally in each distributed generator and reacts to loadvariations. Numerous recent works propose to implement the secondary control ina distributed fashion, relying on a communication system to achieve consensusamong MG units. This paper shows that, if the system is not designed to copewith adversary communication impairments, then a malicious attacker can apply asimple jamming of a few units of the MG and thus compromise the secondary MGcontrol. Compared to other denial-of-service attacks that are oriented againstthe tertiary control, such as economic dispatch, the attack on the secondarycontrol presented here can be more severe, as it disrupts the basicfunctionality of the MG.

On the Impact of Wireless Jamming on the Distributed Secondary Microgrid Control