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In the scope of VANETs, nature of exchanged safety/warning messages rendersitself highly location dependent as it is usually for incident reporting. Thus,vehicles are required to periodically exchange beacon messages that includespeed, time and GPS location information. In this paper paper, we present aphysical layer assisted message authentication scheme that uses Angle ofArrival (AoA) estimation to verify the message originator location based on theclaimed location information. Within the considered vehicular communicationsettings, fundamental limits of AoA estimation are developed in terms of itsCramer Rao Bound (CRB) and existence of efficient estimator. The problem ofdeciding whether the received signal is originated from the claimed GPSlocation is formulated as a two sided hypotheses testing problem whose solutionis given by Wald test statics. Moreover, we use correct decision, $P_D$, andfalse alarm, $P_F$, probabilities as a quantitative performance measure. Theobservation posterior likelihood function is shown to satisfy regularityconditions necessary for asymptotic normality of the ML-AoA estimator. Thus, wegive $P_D$ and $P_F$ in a closed form.  We extend the potential of physical layer contribution in security to providephysical layer assisted secret key agreement (SKA) protocol. A public key (PK)based SKA in which communicating vehicles are required to validate theirrespective physical location. We show that the risk of the Man in the Middleattack, which is common in PK-SKA protocols without a trusted third party, iswaived up to the literal meaning of the word "middle".

Message Authentication and Secret Key Agreement in VANETs via Angle of Arrival