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In recent time, the standards for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) andIntelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) matured and scientific and industryinterest is high especially as autonomous driving gets a lot of mediaattention. Autonomous driving and other assistance systems for cars make heavyuse of VANETs to exchange information.They may provide more comfort, securityand safety for drivers. However, it is of crucial importance for the user'strust in these assistance systems that they could not be influenced bymalicious users. VANETs are likely attack vectors for such malicious users,hence application-specific security requirements must be considered during thedesign of applications using VANETs. In literature, many attacks on vehicularcommunication have been described but attacks on specific vehicular networkingapplications are often missing. This paper fills in this gap by describingstandardized vehicular networking applications, defining and extending previousattacker models, and using the resulting new models to characterize thepossible attackers interested in the specific vehicular networking application.The attacker models presented in this paper hopefully provide great benefit forthe scientific community and industry as they allow to compare securityevaluations of different works, characterize attackers, their intentions andhelp to plan application-specific security controls for vehicular networkingapplications.

Beyond the Dolev-Yao Model: Realistic Application-Specific Attacker Models for Applications Using Vehicular Communication