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HTTP response size is a well-known side channel attack. With the deploymentof HTTP/2.0, response size attacks are generally dismissed with the argumentthat pipelining and response multiplexing prevent eavesdroppers from findingout response sizes. Yet the extent to which pipelining and responsemultiplexing actually hide HTTP response sizes has not been adequatelyinvestigated. In this paper we set out to help understand the effect ofpipelining in hiding the size of web objects on the Internet. We conduct anexperiment that provides browser-side HTTP response sizes and network-capturedTLS record sizes and show how the model that we propose for estimating responsesizes from TLS record sizes improves response matching and attack performance.In this process we gather evidence on how different implementations of HTTP/2.0web servers generate different side- channel information and the limited amountof pipelining and response multiplexing used on the Internet today.

An initial study of the effect of pipelining in hiding HTTP/2.0 response sizes