English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

In this paper, we consider revenue maximization problem for a two serversystem in the presence of heterogeneous customers. We assume that the customersdiffer in their cost for unit delay and this is modeled as a continuous randomvariable with a distribution $F.$ We also assume that each server charges anadmission price to each customer that decide to join its queue. We firstconsider the monopoly problem where both the servers belong to a singleoperator. The heterogeneity of the customer makes the analysis of the problemdifficult. The difficulty lies in the inability to characterize the equilibriumqueue arrival rates as a function of the admission prices. We provide anequivalent formulation with the queue arrival rates as the optimizationvariable simplifying the analysis for revenue rate maximization for themonopoly. We then consider the duopoly problem where each server competes withthe other server to maximize its revenue rate. For the duopoly problem, theinterest is to obtain the set of admission prices satisfying the Nashequilibrium conditions. While the problem is in general difficult to analyze,we consider the special case when the two servers are identical. For such aduopoly system, we obtain the necessary condition for existence of symmetricNash equilibrium of the admission prices. The knowledge of the distribution $F$characterizing the heterogeneity of the customers is necessary to solve themonopoly and the duopoly problem. However, for most practical scenarios, thefunctional form of $F$ may not be known to the system operator and in suchcases, the revenue maximizing prices cannot be determined. In the last part ofthe paper, we provide a simple method to estimate the distribution $F$ bysuitably varying the admission prices. We illustrate the method with somenumerical examples.

Revenue Maximization in Service Systems with Heterogeneous Customers