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Traffic correlation attacks to de-anonymize Tor users are possible when anadversary is in a position to observe traffic entering and exiting the Tornetwork. Recent work has brought attention to the threat of these attacks bynetwork-level adversaries (e.g., Autonomous Systems). We perform a historicalanalysis to understand how the threat from AS-level traffic correlation attackshas evolved over the past five years. We find that despite a large number ofnew relays added to the Tor network, the threat has grown. This points to theimportance of increasing AS-level diversity in addition to capacity of the Tornetwork.  We identify and elaborate on common pitfalls of AS-aware Tor client designand construction. We find that succumbing to these pitfalls can negativelyimpact three major aspects of an AS-aware Tor client -- (1) security againstAS-level adversaries, (2) security against relay-level adversaries, and (3)performance. Finally, we propose and evaluate a Tor client -- Cipollino --which avoids these pitfalls using state-of-the-art in network-measurement. Ourevaluation shows that Cipollino is able to achieve better security againstnetwork-level adversaries while maintaining security against relay-leveladversaries and

Holding all the ASes: Identifying and Circumventing the Pitfalls of AS-aware Tor Client Design