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According to evolutionary game theory, cooperation in public goods games iseliminated by free-riders, yet in nature, cooperation is ubiquitous. Artificialmodels resolve this contradiction via the mechanism of network reciprocity.However, existing research only addresses pre-existing networks and does notspecifically consider their origins. Further, much work has focused onscale-free networks and so pre-supposes attachment mechanisms which may notexist in nature. We present a coevolutionary model of public goods games innetworks, growing by random attachment, from small founding populations ofsimple agents. The model demonstrates the emergence of cooperation inmoderately heterogeneous networks, regardless of original founders' behaviour,and absent higher cognitive abilities such as recognition or memory. It maythus illustrate a more general mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, fromearly origins, in minimally cognitive organisms. It is the first example of amodel explaining cooperation in public goods games on growing networks.

The emergence of cooperation in public goods games on randomly growing dynamic networks