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In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agreeon the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bidthat is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice insponsored search we consider a situation where the auctioneer uses estimates ofthe relative values, which may be imprecise, and show that under both completeand incomplete information a non-truthful mechanism is able to support anefficient outcome in equilibrium for a wider range of these estimates than theVCG mechanism. We thus exhibit a property of the VCG mechanism that may helpexplain the surprising rarity with which it is used even in settings with unitdemand, a relative lack of robustness to misspecification of the biddinglanguage. The result for complete information concerns the generalizedsecond-price mechanism and lends additional theoretical support to the use ofthis mechanism in practice. Particularly interesting from a technicalperspective is the result for incomplete information, which is driven by asurprising connection between equilibrium bids in the VCG mechanism and thegeneralized first-price mechanism.

Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification