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In addition to constraining bilateral exposures of financial institutions,there are essentially two options for future financial regulation of systemicrisk (SR): First, financial regulation could attempt to reduce the financialfragility of global or domestic systemically important financial institutions(G-SIBs or D-SIBs), as for instance proposed in Basel III. Second, futurefinancial regulation could attempt strengthening the financial system as awhole. This can be achieved by re-shaping the topology of financial networks.We use an agent-based model (ABM) of a financial system and the real economy tostudy and compare the consequences of these two options. By conducting three"computer experiments" with the ABM we find that re-shaping financial networksis more effective and efficient than reducing leverage. Capital surcharges forG-SIBs can reduce SR, but must be larger than those specified in Basel III inorder to have a measurable impact. This can cause a loss of efficiency. BaselIII capital surcharges for G-SIBs can have pro-cyclical side effects.

Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs fail to control systemic risk and can cause pro-cyclical side effects