English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Hash-based message authentication codes are an extremely simple yet hugelyeffective construction for producing keyed message digests using sharedsecrets. HMACs have seen widespread use as ad-hoc digital signatures in manyInternet applications. While messages signed with an HMAC are secure againstsender impersonation and tampering in transit, if used alone they aresusceptible to replay attacks. We propose a construction that extends HMACs toproduce a keyed message digest that has a finite validity period. We thenpropose a message signature scheme that uses this time-dependent MAC along withan unique message identifier to calculate a set of authentication factors usingwhich a recipient can readily detect and ignore replayed messages, thusproviding perfect resistance against replay attacks. We further analysetime-based message authentication codes and show that they provide strongersecurity guarantees than plain HMACs, even when used independently of theaforementioned replay attack resistant message signature scheme.

A replay-attack resistant message authentication scheme using time-based keying hash functions and unique message identifiers