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In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channelsto the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the availability ofunused channels of its competitors. We consider a model were a primary canacquire its competitor's channel state information (C-CSI) at a cost. Weformulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether toacquire C-CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. We firstcharacterize the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game for a symmetric model wherethe C-CSI is perfect. We show that the payoff of a primary is independent ofthe C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow forimperfect estimation and cases where the two primaries have different C-CSIcosts or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly thatthe payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also showthat surprisingly, the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSIacquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities.

The value of Side Information in Secondary Spectrum Markets