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The stag hunt (or assurance game) is a simple game that has been used as aprototype of a variety of social coordination problems (ranging from the socialcontract to the adoption of technical standards). Players have the option toeither use a superior cooperative strategy whose payoff depends on the otherplayers' choices or use an inferior strategy whose payoff is independent ofwhat other players do; the cooperative strategy may incur a loss ifsufficiently many other players do not cooperate. Stag hunts have two (strict)pure Nash equilibria, namely, universal cooperation and universal defection (aswell as a mixed equilibrium of low predictive value). Selection of the inferior(pure) equilibrium is called a coordination failure. In this paper, we presentand analyze using game-theoretic techniques mechanisms aiming to avertcoordination failures and incite instead selection of the superior equilibrium.Our analysis is based on the solution concepts of Nash equilibrium, dominancesolvability, as well as a formalization of the notion of "incrementaldeployability," which is shown to be keenly relevant to the sink equilibrium.

Jump-starting coordination in a stag hunt: Motivation, mechanisms, and their analysis