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We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which theprobabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoffconsequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizingthe rate of decay of the probability that the sample path of the evolutionaryprocess lies in a prespecified set as the population size approaches infinity.We use these results to describe excursion rates and stationary distributionasymptotics in settings where the mean dynamic admits a globally attractingstate, and we compute these rates explicitly for the case of logit choice inpotential games.

Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics