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Today, much of our sensitive information is stored inside mobile applications(apps), such as the browsing histories and chatting logs. To safeguard theseprivacy files, modern mobile systems, notably Android and iOS, use sandboxes toisolate apps' file zones from one another. However, we show in this paper thatthese private files can still be leaked by indirectly exploiting componentsthat are trusted by the victim apps. In particular, we devise new indirect fileleak (IFL) attacks that exploit browser interfaces, command interpreters, andembedded app servers to leak data from very popular apps, such as Evernote andQQ. Unlike the previous attacks, we demonstrate that these IFLs can affect bothAndroid and iOS. Moreover, our IFL methods allow an adversary to launch theattacks remotely, without implanting malicious apps in victim's smartphones. Wefinally compare the impacts of four different types of IFL attacks on Androidand iOS, and propose several mitigation methods.

Cross-Platform Analysis of Indirect File Leaks in Android and iOS Applications