English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We prove that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis, finding an\epsilon-approximately optimal symmetric signaling scheme in a two-playerzero-sum game requires quasi-polynomial time. This is tight by [Cheng et al.,FOCS'15] and resolves an open question of [Dughmi, FOCS'14]. We also prove thatfinding a multiplicative approximation is NP-hard.  We also introduce a new model where a dishonest signaler may publicly committo use one scheme, but post signals according to a different scheme. For thismodel, we prove that even finding a (1-2^{-n})-approximately optimal scheme isNP-hard.

Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder