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The likelihood principle makes strong claims about the nature of statisticalevidence but is controversial. Its claims are undermined by the existence ofseveral examples that are assumed to show that it allows, with unityprobability, domination of all other hypotheses by the uninteresting,determinist hypothesis that whatever happened had to happen. Such examples aregenerally assumed to be important obstacles to the application of thelikelihood principle: they are counter-examples to the principle. A re-analysisof Birnbaum's 1969 `counter-example', demonstrates that the standardly reportedanalyses of such examples involves an inappropriate treatment of a nuisanceparameter and that, when the nuisance parameter is adequately considered, thereis no conflict between the evidential consequences of the likelihood principleand the intuitive evidential account of the problem. It also shows that theconclusion that the likelihood principle allows the determinist hypothesis todominate with unity probability requires a misconception about the scope of thelikelihood principle or an inappropriately specified statistical model.Whatever happened did \textit{not} have to happen.

The likelihood principle does not entail a `sure thing', `evil demon' or `determinist' hypothesis