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Protocols for tasks such as authentication, electronic voting, and securemultiparty computation ensure desirable security properties if agents followtheir prescribed programs. However, if some agents deviate from theirprescribed programs and a security property is violated, it is important tohold agents accountable by determining which deviations actually caused theviolation. Motivated by these applications, we initiate a formal study ofprogram actions as actual causes. Specifically, we define in an interactingprogram model what it means for a set of program actions to be an actual causeof a violation. We present a sound technique for establishing program actionsas actual causes. We demonstrate the value of this formalism in two ways.First, we prove that violations of a specific class of safety properties alwayshave an actual cause. Thus, our definition applies to relevant securityproperties. Second, we provide a cause analysis of a representative protocoldesigned to address weaknesses in the current public key certificationinfrastructure.

Program Actions as Actual Causes: A Building Block for Accountability