English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution conceptbetween the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution isdefined as the limiting superdifferential of the Lovasz extension and thus itcompletes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core(Frechet superdifferential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdifferential). It isshown that the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Paretooptimal payoff vectors that depend on some chain of coalitions and marginalcoalitional contributions with respect to the chain. A detailed comparisonbetween the intermediate set and other set-valued solutions is provided. Wecompute the exact form of intermediate set for all games and provide itssimplified characterization for the simple games and the glove game.

The Intermediate Set and Limiting Superdifferential for Coalition Games: Between the Core and the Weber Set