English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proofvoting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In\cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even ifwe consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness where voters believe that theother voters' preferences are i.i.d.~(independent and identically distributed):If an anonymous voting rule (with at least three candidates) is strategy-proofw.r.t.~all i.i.d.~beliefs and is also Pareto efficient, then the voting rulemust be a random dictatorship. In this paper, we strengthen McLennan's resultby relaxing Pareto efficiency to $\epsilon$-Pareto efficiency where Paretoefficiency can be violated with probability $\epsilon$, and we further relax$\epsilon$-Pareto efficiency to a very weak notion of efficiency which we call$\epsilon$-super-weak unanimity. We then show the following: If an anonymousvoting rule (with at least three candidates) is strategy-proof w.r.t.~alli.i.d.~beliefs and also satisfies $\epsilon$-super-weak unanimity, then thevoting rule must be $O(\epsilon)$-close to random dictatorship.

Stronger Impossibility Results for Strategy-Proof Voting with i.i.d. Beliefs