English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Societies consisting of cooperative individuals seem to require for theircontinuing success that defectors be policed. The precise connection betweenpunishers and benefits, population structure, and division of labour, however,remains ill-understood. Many models assume costly "peer punishment" to enforcecooperation, but results in the economics literature suggest that thisassumption may not be generally valid. In many human and animal societies,there is a division of labour between a purely supportive majority and adedicated minority of police-like enforcers. Here we present several extensionsto the Public Goods Game with punishment which allow for this possibility, andevaluate their influence on the level of cooperative behaviour. We find that astructure of separate subpopulations, which only interact through migration ofindividuals, can have a strong effect on the evolutionary dynamics of a systemand significantly facilitate cooperation. Forcing defectors to contribute andenabling fitness transfers to punishers both have a weak positive effect oncooperation levels. In the presence of group competition, however, evolutionaryeffects can paradoxically hinder cooperation.

Structured populations facilitate cooperation in policed Public Goods Games