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The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights forunderstanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamicalsystems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. Inparticular, using this perspective, we discuss the differences between twosolution concepts for such games - namely, those of Nash equilibrium andco-action equilibrium. For the Nash equilibrium, we show that the dynamicalview can provide an equilibrium refinement, selecting one equilibrium amongseveral possibilities, thereby solving the issue of multiple equilibria thatappear in some games. We illustrate in detail this dynamical perspective byconsidering three well known 2-person games namely the Prisoner's Dilemma, gameof Chicken and the Stag-Hunt. We find that in all of these cases, co-actionequilibria tends to correspond to `nicer' strategies than those correspondingto Nash equilibria.

A dynamical view of different solution paradigms in two-person symmetric games: Nash vs co-action equilibria