English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddleis how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world.Game-theoretical studies showed that pool punishment, particularly second-orderpunishment, plays a key role in understanding the evolution of cooperation.Second-order pool punishment, however, is tautological in nature; thepunishment system itself is caused by its own effects. The emergence of poolpunishment poses a logical conundrum that, to date, has been overlooked in thestudy of the evolution of social norms and institutions. Here, we tackle theissue by considering the interplay of (a) cognitive biases in reasoning and (b)Agamben's notion of homo sacer (Agamben, G. 1998, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Powerand Bare Life, Stanford University Press); that is, a person who may be killedwithout legal consequences. Based on the cognitive disposition of reversing thecause-and-effect relationship, we propose a new system: the preemptivepunishment of homo sacer. This action can lead to retrospectively forming moralassessments, particularly for second-order pool punishment. This studypotentially provides new insight into the evolutionary process behind theemergence of social norms and institutions.

Preemptive punishment and the emergence of sanctioning institutions