English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designedbased on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature,however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agentsin a variety of environments, both online and offline. What consequences mightsuch differences have for the optimal design of mechanisms in theseenvironments? In this paper, we explore this question in the context of optimalcontest design for simple agents---agents who strategically reason aboutwhether or not to participate in a system, but not about the input they provideto it. Specifically, consider a contest where $n$ potential contestants withtypes $(q_i,c_i)$ each choose between participating and producing a submissionof quality $q_i$ at cost $c_i$, versus not participating at all, to maximizetheir utilities. How should a principal distribute a total prize $V$ amongstthe $n$ ranks to maximize some increasing function of the qualities of elicitedsubmissions in a contest with such simple agents?  We first solve the optimal contest design problem for settings withhomogenous participation costs $c_i = c$. Here, the optimal contest is always asimple contest, awarding equal prizes to the top $j^*$ contestants for asuitable choice of $j^*$. (In comparable models with strategic effort choices,the optimal contest is either a winner-take-all contest or awards possiblyunequal prizes, depending on the curvature of agents' effort cost functions.)We next address the general case with heterogeneous costs where agents' typesare inherently two-dimensional, significantly complicating equilibriumanalysis. Our main result here is that the winner-take-all contest is a3-approximation of the optimal contest when the principal's objective is tomaximize the quality of the best elicited contribution.

Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Contests for Simple Agents