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Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm which takes advantage ofpervasive smartphones to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novelapplications. To achieve good service quality for a MCS application, incentivemechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation. Most of existingmechanisms apply only for the offline scenario where all users' information areknown a priori. On the contrary, we focus on a more realistic scenario whereusers arrive one by one online in a random order. Based on the online auctionmodel, we investigate the problem that users submit their private profiles tothe crowdsourcer when they arrive, and the crowdsourcer aims at selecting asubset of users before a specified deadline for minimizing the total paymentwhile a specific number of tasks can be completed.We design three onlinemechanisms, Homo-OMZ, Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG, all of which can satisfy thecomputational efficiency, individual rationality, cost-truthfulness, andconsumer sovereignty. The Homo-OMZ mechanism is applicable to the homogeneoususer model and can satisfy the social efficiency but not constant frugality.The Hetero-OMZ and Hetero-OMG mechanisms are applicable to both the homogeneousand heterogeneous user models, and can satisfy the constant frugality. Besides,the Hetero-OMG mechanism can also satisfy the time-truthfulness. Throughextensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoreticalproperties of our online mechanisms.

Frugal Online Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Tasks Truthfully