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In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address theproblem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. Wedesign an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expectedutility, when the spectrum is not available with certainty. We assume that themoderator employs collaborative spectrum sensing in order to make a reliableinference about spectrum availability. Due to the presence of a collision costwhenever the moderator makes an erroneous inference, and a sensing cost at eachCR, we investigate feasibility conditions that guarantee a non-negative utilityat the moderator. We present tight theoretical-bounds on instantaneous networkthroughput and also show that our algorithm provides maximum throughput if theCRs have i.i.d. valuations. Since the moderator fuses CRs' sensing decisions toobtain a global inference regarding spectrum availability, we propose a novelstrategy-proof fusion rule that encourages the CRs to simultaneously revealtruthful sensing decisions, along with truthful valuations to the moderator.Numerical examples are also presented to provide insights into the performanceof the proposed auction under different scenarios.

Optimal Spectrum Auction Design with Two-Dimensional Truthful Revelations under Uncertain Spectrum Availability