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We model smart grids as complex interdependent networks, and study targetedattacks on smart grids for the first time. A smart grid consists of twonetworks: the power network and the communication network, interconnected byedges. Occurrence of failures (attacks) in one network triggers failures in theother network, and propagates in cascades across the networks. Such cascadingfailures can result in disintegration of either (or both) of the networks.Earlier works considered only random failures. In practical situations, anattacker is more likely to compromise nodes selectively.  We study cascading failures in smart grids, where an attacker selectivelycompromises the nodes with probabilities proportional to their degrees; highdegree nodes are compromised with higher probability. We mathematically analyzethe sizes of the giant components of the networks under targeted attacks, andcompare the results with the corresponding sizes under random attacks. We showthat networks disintegrate faster for targeted attacks compared to randomattacks. A targeted attack on a small fraction of high degree nodesdisintegrates one or both of the networks, whereas both the networks containgiant components for random attack on the same fraction of nodes.

Analyzing Cascading Failures in Smart Grids under Random and Targeted Attacks