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We consider a mechanism design problem for energy procurement, when there isone buyer and one seller, and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The sellercan generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random)plants, and has multi-dimensional private information which determines herproduction cost. The objective is to maximize the buyer's utility under theconstraint that the seller voluntarily participates in the energy procurementprocess. We show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of contracts (nonlinearpricing) that the buyer offers to the seller, and the seller chooses one basedon her private information.

Optimal Energy Procurement from a Strategic Seller with Private Renewable and Conventional Generation