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Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-replyfashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired whilereplies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations oftenforce individuals to prioritize some while neglecting others. This dilemma willinevitably force individuals into defecting against some communication partnersto give attention to others. Furthermore, communication entirely breaks downwhen individuals act purely egoistically as replies would never be issued andquest for desired information would always be prioritized. Here we present anexperiment, termed "The expert game", where a number of individuals communicatewith one-another through an electronic messaging system. By imposing a strictlimit on the number of sent messages, individuals were required to decidebetween requesting information that is beneficial for themselves or helpingothers by replying to their requests. In the experiment, individuals wereassigned the task to find the expert on a specific topic and receive a replyfrom that expert. Tasks and expertise of each player were periodicallyre-assigned to randomize the required interactions. Resisting thisrandomization, a non-random network of cooperative communication betweenindividuals formed. We use a simple Bayesian inference algorithm to model eachplayer's trust in the cooperativity of others with good experimental agreement.Our results suggest that human communication in groups of individuals isstrategic and favors cooperation with trusted parties at the cost of defectionagainst others. To establish and maintain trusted links a significant fractionof time-resources is allocated, even in situations where the informationtransmitted is negligible.

The expert game -- Cooperation in social communication