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Market trade-routes can support infectious-disease transmission, impactingbiological populations and even disrupting causal trade. Epidemiological modelsincreasingly account for reductions in infectious contact, such asrisk-aversion behaviour in response to pathogen outbreaks. However, marketdynamics clearly differ from simple risk-aversion, as are driven by differentmotivation and conditioned by trade constraints, known in economics asfriction, that arise because exchanges are costly. Here we develop a noveleconomic-market model where transient and long-term market dynamics aredetermined by trade friction and agent adaptation, and can influence diseasetransmission. We specify the participants, frequency, volume, and price intrade transactions, and investigate, using analytical insights and simulation,how trade friction affects joint market and epidemiological dynamics. Thefriction values explored encompass estimates from French cattle and pigmarkets. We show that, when trade is the dominant route of transmission, marketfriction can be a significantly stronger determinant of epidemics thanrisk-aversion behaviour. In particular, there is a critical friction levelabove which epidemics do not occur. For a given level of friction, openunregulated markets can boost epidemics compared with closed or tightlyregulated markets. Our results are robust to model specificities and can holdin the presence of non-trade disease-transmission routes. In particular, we tryto explain why outbreaks in French livestock markets appear more frequently incattle than swine despite swine trade-flow being larger. To minimize contagionin markets, safety policies could generate incentives for larger-volume,less-frequent transactions, increasing trade friction without necessarilyaffecting overall trade flow.

Epidemics in markets with trade friction and imperfect transactions