English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations ofbeliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis ofdifferent structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities.Special attention is also paid to the decision-theoretic principle known as thethesis of no subjective probability for self-action. Conditions in cope withthis principle are given which underlie the interrelationships betweendifferent models of beliefs, and it is shown that under these conditionsdifferent doxastic structures can be coherently unified.

Towards a Unified Belief Structure in Games with indeterminate probabilities