English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile networkoperators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Givenasymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-pricesealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOsand users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game'sequilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market sharebetween two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show thatthe MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his serviceprice despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show thatthe MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higherprice, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further showthat the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. Byinvestigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, itserves as the benchmark of practical auction designs.

Asymmetric-valued Spectrum Auction and Competition in Wireless Broadband Services