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As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowlygains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize securepath validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Originauthentication already does much to improve routing security. Moreover, thetransition to S*BGP is expected to be long and slow, with S*BGP coexisting in"partial deployment" alongside BGP for a long time. We therefore usetheoretical and experimental approach to study the security benefits providedby partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already provided by originauthentication. Because routing policies have a profound impact on routingsecurity, we use a survey of 100 network operators to find the policies thatare likely to be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find thatS*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin authentication when thesepopular policies are used. We also study the security benefits of other routingpolicies, provide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP, andshow how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can introduce new vulnerabilitiesinto the routing system.

BGP Security in Partial Deployment: Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?