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The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matchingmechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given publicschool district. Previously considered criteria for evaluating proposedmechanisms such as stability, strategyproofness and Pareto efficiency do notalways translate into desirable student assignments. In this note, we explore aclass of one-sided, cardinal utility maximizing matching mechanisms focusedexclusively on student preferences. We adapt a well-known combinatorialoptimization technique (the Hungarian algorithm) as the kernel of this class ofmatching mechanisms. We find that, while such mechanisms can be adapted to meetdesirable criteria not met by any previously employed mechanism in the schoolchoice literature, they are not strategyproof. We discuss the practicalimplications and limitations of our approach at the end of the article.

School Choice as a One-Sided Matching Problem: Cardinal Utilities and Optimization