English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certainpairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional costwhen they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated withthe increase in load. Questions regarding such interactions apply beyondallocating jobs to machines: when people in a social network choose to alignthemselves with a group or party, they typically do so based upon not only theinherent quality of that group, but also who amongst their friends (or enemies)choose that group as well. We show how semi-smoothness, a recently introducedgeneralization of smoothness, is necessary to find tight or near-tight boundson the price of total anarchy, and thus on the quality of correlated and Nashequilibria, for several natural job-assignment games with interacting jobs. Formost cases, our bounds on the price of total anarchy are either exactly 2 orapproach 2. We also prove new convergence results implied by semi-smoothnessfor our games. Finally we consider coalitional deviations, and prove resultsabout the existence and quality of Strong equilibrium.

Assignment Games with Conflicts: Price of Total Anarchy and Convergence Results via Semi-Smoothness