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The general use of subjective probabilities to model belief has beenjustified using many axiomatic schemes. For example, ?consistent bettingbehavior' arguments are well-known. To those not already convinced of theunique fitness and generality of probability models, such justifications areoften unconvincing. The present paper explores another rationale forprobability models. ?Qualitative probability,' which is known to providestringent constraints on belief representation schemes, is derived from fivesimple assumptions about relationships among beliefs. While counterparts offamiliar rationality concepts such as transitivity, dominance, and consistencyare used, the betting context is avoided. The gap between qualitativeprobability and probability proper can be bridged by any of several additionalassumptions. The discussion here relies on results common in the recent AIliterature, introducing a sixth simple assumption. The narrative emphasizesmodels based on unique complete orderings, but the rationale extends easily tomotivate set-valued representations of partial orderings as well.

Intuitions about Ordered Beliefs Leading to Probabilistic Models