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We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who canchoose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for socialdilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application ofthe usual strategies in the present model the players are also characterized byone of the two extreme personal features representing the egoist or fraternalbehavior. During the evolution each player can modify both her own strategyand/or personal feature via a myopic update process in order to improve herutility. The results of numerical simulations and stability analysis aresummarized in phase diagrams representing a wide scale of spatially ordereddistribution of strategies and personal features when varying the payoffparameters. In most of the cases only two of the four possible options prevailand may form sublattice ordered spatial structure. The evolutionary advantageof the fraternal attitude is demonstrated within a large range of payoffparameters including the region of prisoner's dilemma where egoist defectorsand fraternal cooperators form a role-separating chessboard-like pattern.

Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas