English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Secure communication over a memoryless wiretap channel in the presence of apassive eavesdropper is considered. Traditional information-theoretic securitymethods require an advantage for the main channel over the eavesdropper channelto achieve a positive secrecy rate, which in general cannot be guaranteed inwireless systems. Here, we exploit the non-linear conversion operation in theeavesdropper's receiver to obtain the desired advantage - even when theeavesdropper has perfect access to the transmitted signal at the input to theirreceiver. The basic idea is to employ an ephemeral cryptographic key to forcethe eavesdropper to conduct two operations, at least one of which isnon-linear, in a different order than the desired recipient. Since non-linearoperations are not necessarily commutative, the desired advantage can beobtained and information-theoretic secrecy achieved even if the eavesdropper isgiven the cryptographic key immediately upon transmission completion. Inessence, the lack of knowledge of the key during the short transmission timeinhibits the recording of the signal in such a way that the secret informationcan never be extracted from it. The achievable secrecy rates for differentcountermeasures that the eavesdropper might employ are evaluated. It is shownthat even in the case of an eavesdropper with uniformly better conditions(channel and receiver quality) than the intended recipient, a positive securerate can be achieved.

Everlasting Secrecy by Exploiting Non-Idealities of the Eavesdropper's Receiver