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In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff betweenefficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic marketarchitectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resourceprovider and agents that enter and exit the market following a random process.Self-interested and fully rational agents dynamically update their resourceconsumption decisions over a finite time horizon, under the constraint that thetotal resource consumption requirements are met before each individual'sdeadline. We then compare the statistics of the stationary aggregate demandprocesses induced by the non-cooperative and cooperative load schedulingschemes. We show that although the non-cooperative load scheduling scheme leadsto an efficiency loss - widely known as the "price of anarchy" - the stationarydistribution of the corresponding aggregate demand process has a smaller tail.This tail, which corresponds to rare and undesirable demand spikes, isimportant in many applications of interest. On the other hand, when the agentscan cooperate with each other in optimizing their total cost, a higher marketefficiency is achieved at the cost of a higher probability of demand spikes. Wethus posit that the origins of endogenous risk in such systems may lie in themarket architecture, which is an inherent characteristic of the system.

Efficiency-Risk Tradeoffs in Dynamic Oligopoly Markets - with application to electricity markets