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In this letter, we concentrate on the very recently proposed MeasurementDevice Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) protocol by Lo, Curty andQi (PRL, 2012). We study how one can suitably present an eavesdropping strategyon MDI QKD, that is in the direction of the fundamental CNOT attack on BB84protocol, though our approach is quite different. In this strategy, Eve will beable to know expected half of the secret bits communicated between Alice andBob with certainty (probability 1) without introducing any error. Further, forthe remaining bits, where Eve will only be able to predict the bit values as inrandom guess (with probability 1/2), she will certainly find out whether herinteraction induced an error in the secret bits between the communicatingparties. Given the asymmetric nature of the CNOT attack, we also introduceHadamard gates to present a symmetric version. Though our analysis does notrefute the security claims in MDI QKD, adapting the CNOT attack in thisscenario requires nontrivial approach using entanglement swapping.

Third Party CNOT Attack on MDI QKD