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Drawing a random sample of ballots to conduct a risk-limiting audit generallyrequires knowing how the ballots cast in an election are organized into groups,for instance, how many containers of ballots there are in all and how manyballots are in each container. A list of the ballot group identifiers alongwith number of ballots in each group is called a ballot manifest. What if theballot manifest is not accurate? Surprisingly, even if ballots are known to bemissing from the manifest, it is not necessary to make worst-case assumptionsabout those ballots--for instance, to adjust the margin by the number ofmissing ballots--to ensure that the audit remains conservative. Rather, itsuffices to make worst-case assumptions about the individual randomly selectedballots that the audit cannot find. This observation provides a simplemodification to some risk-limiting audit procedures that makes themautomatically become more conservative if the ballot manifest has errors. Themodification--phantoms to evil zombies (~2EZ)--requires only an upper bound onthe total number of ballots cast. ~2EZ makes the audit P-value stochasticallylarger than it would be had the manifest been accurate, automatically requiringmore than enough ballots to be audited to offset the manifest errors. Thisensures that the true risk limit remains smaller than the nominal risk limit.On the other hand, if the manifest is in fact accurate and the upper bound onthe total number of ballots equals the total according to the manifest, ~2EZhas no effect at all on the number of ballots audited nor on the true risklimit.

Limiting Risk by Turning Manifest Phantoms into Evil Zombies