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The security proof of continuous variable quantum key distribution(CV QKD)based on two assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the localoscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions maybe invalid inpractice due to some potential imperfections of the implementations of theprotocol. In [Phys.Rev.A, 84.062308], we found that one can control theintensity transmission of the beam splitter by switching the wavelength of theinput light. In this paper, we revisit the problem of transmitting the localoscillator in public channel, and propose a wavelength attack targeting the CVQKD systems using heterodyne protocol. Our attack is proved to be feasible andrenders all final key shared between the legitimate parties insecure even theyhave monitored the intensity. To prevent our attack, a wavelength filter shouldbe added before performing the heterodyne detection.

Wavelength attack scheme on continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using heterodyne detection protocol