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An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing.Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinaryincentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicitpositive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate howthese incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. Whenincentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in theliterature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation.Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. Forexample, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishablereports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. Thepersistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make thefundamental but abstract accuracy motive - getting it right - competitive withthe more tangible and concrete incentive - getting it published. We developstrategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation thataccount for ordinary human motivations and self-serving biases.

Scientific Utopia: II. Restructuring incentives and practices to promote truth over publishability