English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks(LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system.Rather than assuming "by rule" conformance to a protocol designed to regulatepacket-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative gameframework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. The effectsof altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for both the ALOHA and CSMAframeworks in the quasistationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider eitherpower or throughput based costs of networking, and the cases of identical orheterogeneous (independent) users/players. In a numerical study we considerdiverse players, and we see that the effects of altruism for similar playerscan be beneficial in the presence of significant congestion, but excessivealtruism may lead to underuse of the channel when demand is low.

CSMA Local Area Networking under Dynamic Altruism