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Prediction markets provide an efficient means to assess uncertain quantitiesfrom forecasters. Traditional and competitive strictly proper scoring ruleshave been shown to incentivize players to provide truthful probabilisticforecasts. However, we show that when those players can cooperate, thesemechanisms can instead discourage them from reporting what they really believe.When players with different beliefs are able to cooperate and form a coalition,these mechanisms admit arbitrage and there is a report that will always paycoalition members more than their truthful forecasts. If the coalition werecreated by an intermediary, such as a web portal, the intermediary would beguaranteed a profit.

Strictly Proper Mechanisms with Cooperating Players