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In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on theactual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start byproposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a mapfrom the negotiation domain in itself, for any utility profile of the parties.ANM can face both direct and iterative negotiations, since we show that ANMclass is closed under the limit operation. The generality of ANM is proven byshowing that it captures a large class of well known in literature negotiationmethods. Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any Paretoefficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a collusion of few ofthem. We concern about the efficiency of the resulting manipulation. Thus wefind necessarily and sufficient conditions those make manipulability equivalentto actual inefficiency, meaning that the manipulation implies a change of theefficient frontier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, henceactually inefficient, frontier. In particular we distinguish between strong andweak actual inefficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawbackwhich is not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one,so its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility sharingthe same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual inefficiency is adrawback of any mathematical theorization on rational agents which constrain ina particular way their space of utility functions. For the weak actualinefficiency we state a principle of Result's Inconsistency by showing that tofalsify theoretical hypotheses is rational for any agent which is informedabout the preference of the other, even if the theoretical assumptions, whichconstrain the space of agents' utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. thepreferences of each single agent are well modeled.

On the Actual Inefficiency of Efficient Negotiation Methods