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A fact apparently not observed earlier in the literature of nonmonotonicreasoning is that Reiter, in his default logic paper, did not directlyformalize informal defaults. Instead, he translated a default into a certainnatural language proposition and provided a formalization of the latter. A fewyears later, Moore noted that propositions like the one used by Reiter arefundamentally different than defaults and exhibit a certain autoepistemicnature. Thus, Reiter had developed his default logic as a formalization ofautoepistemic propositions rather than of defaults.  The first goal of this paper is to show that some problems of Reiter'sdefault logic as a formal way to reason about informal defaults are directlyattributable to the autoepistemic nature of default logic and to the mismatchbetween informal defaults and the Reiter's formal defaults, the latter being aformal expression of the autoepistemic propositions Reiter used as arepresentation of informal defaults.  The second goal of our paper is to compare the work of Reiter and Moore.While each of them attempted to formalize autoepistemic propositions, the modesof reasoning in their respective logics were different. We revisit Moore's andReiter's intuitions and present them from the perspective of autotheoremhood,where theories can include propositions referring to the theory's own theorems.We then discuss the formalization of this perspective in the logics of Mooreand Reiter, respectively, using the unifying semantic framework for default andautoepistemic logics that we developed earlier. We argue that Reiter's defaultlogic is a better formalization of Moore's intuitions about autoepistemicpropositions than Moore's own autoepistemic logic.

Reiter's Default Logic Is a Logic of Autoepistemic Reasoning And a Good One, Too