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Internet users such as individuals and organizations are subject to differenttypes of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, and botnets. To reduce theprobability of risk, an Internet user generally invests in self-defensemechanisms like antivirus and antispam software. However, such software doesnot completely eliminate risk. Recent works have considered the problem ofresidual risk elimination by proposing the idea of cyber-insurance. In reality,an Internet user faces risks due to security attacks as well as risks due tonon-security related failures (e.g., reliability faults in the form of hardwarecrash, buffer overflow, etc.) . These risk types are often indistinguishable bya naive user. However, a cyber-insurance agency would most likely insure risksonly due to security attacks. In this case, it becomes a challenge for anInternet user to choose the right type of cyber-insurance contract as standardoptimal contracts, i.e., contracts under security attacks only, might prove tobe sub-optimal for himself. In this paper, we address the problem of analyzingcyber-insurance solutions when a user faces risks due to both, security as wellas non-security related failures. We propose \emph{Aegis}, a novelcyber-insurance model in which the user accepts a fraction \emph{(strictlypositive)} of loss recovery on himself and transfers rest of the loss recoveryon the cyber-insurance agency. We mathematically show that given an option,Internet users would prefer Aegis contracts to traditional cyber-insurancecontracts, under all premium types. This result firmly establishes thenon-existence of traditional cyber-insurance markets when Aegis contracts areoffered to users.

A Novel Cyber-Insurance for Internet Security